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An unexpected, organized, serious, and multiple engagement 
with arguments put forward in a manuscript which has 
gained shape, has grown, was written and re-written, was 
shrunk, cut, re-arranged, and which haunted my nights over 
so many years, which was proof-read and re-read so many 
times (though without detecting a number of embarrassing 
typos) − such an engagement is surely the most precious gift 
any scholar can ever receive. I am honoured and happy 
about the initiative taken by the blog editors to discuss the 
book Beyond Human Rights whose revised and updated 
English version will appear (hopefully) in the spring with 
Cambridge University Press. The lucid questions and 
critique raised in the blog contributions made me reconsider 
some points. Besides, the discussion showed where and how 
possibly to continue on the path taken in the book, and this 
is of course encouraging.
Update in times of re-etatisation
Since the finalization of the German edition of the book in 
2013, the international political and legal system has been 
changing. The trend of “humanization” of international law 
may have slowed down or stopped, while State sovereignty 
seems to have become more important again. This may have 
to do with the recognition that strong and well-functioning 
States are needed to protect human rights, that basic 
“Westphalian” principles such as territorial integrity and the 
prohibition on the use of force have been violated and need 
to be re-emphasised, and that non-Western States and 
cultures which have their own views on the meaning of 
human rights are in economic and political terms on the rise.
The global political and economic constellation has changed 
with the rise of the BRIC States and a concomitant decline of 
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the United States and Europe. The question is whether and 
how this power shift affects the international legal system, 
and with this, the status of the individual in it. Was the 
phenomenon of “humanization” or “individualization” of 
international law only “a hallmark of the period of U.S. 
leadership” (William W. Burke-White) which spread an 
ostensibly typically US-American narcissistic rights culture? 
If this were the case, a reversal of the “individualization” of 
international law would seem likely, because the voices of 
non-Western States which have traditionally been more 
sceptical of the purported “individualization” have gained 
more salience. However, I submit in the forthcoming English 
text that political disappointment about the “failure” or 
“abuse” of Western interventions in the Middle East and 
mere assertions of a novel Statism are not able as such to 
destroy the global legal acquis individuel.
Global constitutionalism
Some commentators linked the concept of international 
rights beyond (or “below” or short of) human rights to global 
constitutionalism. By global constitutionalism, I understand 
an ideology (an “-ism”) which reads parts of international as 
being grounded in some form of constitutionalist principles, 
notably the rule of law and human rights, and which 
suggests that international law can and even should be 
interpreted and progressively developed in the direction of 
greater respect for and realization of those principles.
In the forthcoming revised English Chapter 14 I spell this link 
out a bit more clearly than in the German text: “This study is 
based on the assumption that within the domain of 
international law, a constitution-like layer of norms has 
begun to crystallize and is being further developed. We refer 
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to this as a process of constitutionalization of international 
law. International constitutional law includes the structural 
norms that define membership in the constitutional 
community, provisions on institutions and their powers, 
provisions governing the creation of law and conflict 
resolution, as well as substantive guide lines and principles 
embodying values. Human rights belong to the layer of 
international constitutional law. The ‘ordinary’ individual 
rights do not belong to this layer, but rather (figuratively) to 
the layer of ordinary international law ‘below’ that layer. This 
distinction between two layers of norms in international law, 
namely international constitutional law on the one hand 
(including international human rights) and ‘ordinary’ 
international law on the other hand (including ‘ordinary’ 
individual rights), is still only rudimentary. So far, there are 
hardly any special law-making processes guaranteeing that 
international constitutional law would be more difficult to 
amend, thus implementing a hierarchy of norms within 
international law.”
The contribution of rights “below” human rights to a 
normative hierarchy within international law would be one 
link to global constitutionalism. Besides, Beyond Human 
Rights is a “constitutionalist” contribution to international 
law scholarship because it considers (as I write in Chapter 
17), the new international legal status of the human being as 
“an expression of a normative individualism. The idea here is 
that politics and law ultimately should be guided and 
justified by the concerns of the people affected by them. 
That paradigm does not dispute that people live socially (i.e. 
in communities), that their identity is constituted in part by 
those communities, that people act jointly, and that they 
have and should have collective goals. These collective 
projects must, however, ultimately be measured by the 
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needs and interests of the people affected and are not an 
end in themselves. From that perspective, precisely this 
orientation toward the individual in (different, overlapping, 
changing) communities justifies international law as a 
whole.”
The power of persuasion: Zoran Oklopcic
But fortunately, as Zoran Oklopcic observes, the analysis 
presented in Beyond Human Rights is not necessarily tied to 
global constitutionalism, but can also be “read as a 
standalone”. In his lucid comments on the overall structure 
of my argument, Zoran opines that only a “narrow subset” of 
“contemporary dignifiers of statism” could be „converted“ to 
cosmopolitanism by my book, namely the global bourgeois, 
or − worse even − only “neo-liberals”.
Of course, scholarship is not about conversion but about 
persuasion, deliberation, and argument − as Zoran later 
acknowledges when he urges us to “rethink the styles of 
engagement in international legal theory in general”. My 
style of argument in the book is doctrinal (tracing and 
reconstructing the ideas and legal concepts, and suggesting 
a new one), practical (identifying the relevant hard and soft 
law texts and statements), and theoretical (only a little bit).
I have no qualms with admitting that all this includes a 
normative dimension. The explanation is simply that a 
normative analysis of the law and of its applications is, 
firstly, to some extent inevitable, and secondly, even 
desirable. The first point is its inevitability: Because of the 
leeway inherent in any interpretation and application of a 
rule to the facts, any evaluation of legal practice is, in the 
sense of a theory of science, a “normative” and not merely a 
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“positive” analysis. Although a normative analysis can ideal 
typically be distinguished from positive analysis (in which 
the law is “only” described, explained, and prognosticated), it 
is banal to admit that there is in reality a blurred 
intermediate zone. First, because “description” is in itself 
already a constructive and systematic performance, which is 
based on numerous distinctions and choices. The “observer” 
must choose the actors, the acts, the periods of examination, 
and he must interpret texts. In all this, the observer’s 
(“normative”) preconceptions pre-structure her “positive” 
description. The inevitable blurriness between positive and 
normative analysis does not mean that we should give up the 
distinction between both types of analysis as an idée 
régulatrice (we should not abandon it) − but that we should 
harbour no illusions about its sharpness.
The second and I think more important point is that a 
normative analysis of international law is, due to specific 
features of international law, both inevitable and desirable. 
Because of the typical indeterminacy and vagueness of 
treaty provisions and by a large number of unwritten norms 
much more doubt hovers over the existence of the lex lata
than in domestic law, which is relatively fully and precisely 
codified in the form of codes, laws, and decrees. In addition, 
international law has evolved gradually, often out of soft law 
texts. The exact point of change from a pre-legal practice to 
a hard rule of international customary law can hardly be 
pinpointed. For these reasons, neither the canons of 
construction for treaty interpretation nor empirical research 
on the formation of customary law will in themselves yield 
clear results. The findings must be complemented by 
normative (evaluative) considerations. For example, it makes 
sense to qualify a practice and the accompanying opinio 
iuris as sufficiently general and enduring when the legal 
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norm identified thereby is overall in conformity with the 
international legal system and in harmony with other 
international legal principles.
I take the point that my analysis of the individual’s legal 
status risks, as any conceptual proposal, to sell a scholarly 
idea (or an at best “emerging” norm) for law as it stands. 
Generally speaking, the “premature” labelling of barely 
discernible “norms” or concepts as valid law is in 
methodological terms flawed because it mixes (beyond what 
is inevitable) positive and normative analysis. Moreover, it 
risks undermining the normative power of international law 
as a whole. When a scholar wrongly asserts the existence of 
a legal norm, he or she usurps the position of a law-maker 
without normative justification.
However, an evaluative systematization and an evaluative 
closure of legal gaps is exactly what international legal 
scholarship is about − because of the inherent graduality of 
the international legal process and because of the 
indeterminacy of treaty law mentioned above. These typical 
features of international law prevent the purely “positive” 
analysis from generating clear and unequivocal results. And 
because States could then more or less choose that 
interpretation of the law which suits them best, any auto-
limitation of scholars to “description” of the law and legal 
practice “as it stands” would make it even easier for States to 
disregard international law under cover of law. I submit that 
problems and perils of ideology can hardly be avoided by 
concentrating on seemingly value-free “positive” analysis, 
and this is why Beyond Human Rights does not even purport 
to do that.
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Democracy and reversibility of simple international rights: 
Michael Riegner
Michael Riegner applies the framework suggested in Beyond 
Human Rights to information rights. While the right to 
information (Art. 19(2) ICCPR) is widely recognized as a 
human right, its exact scope and reach is not fully clear. 
Some emanations such as the right of access to official 
documents (see the CoE Convention ETS No. 205 of 2009 
[not in force] and the EU Transparency Regulation 149 of 
2001) are regulated in administrative-law type norms. The 
“information architecture” is a perfect example not only for a 
mix of international, regional, and domestic law (thus 
forming a body of “global” or “transnational” law), but also 
for an interplay of human rights with ordinary or simple 
rights (and obligations) within international law.
Michael then links the idea of “simple” or “ordinary” rights to 
two concepts which play a part for international law more 
generally: Democracy and universality. He reminds us that 
reversibility is an important feature of democratic law. If 
simple rights were more easily amendable or withdrawable 
than human rights, then they were in some sense more 
democratic than entrenched human rights. At first sight, all 
rights enshrined in international treaties enjoy formally the 
same status and are equally difficult to amend. But while 
amendment and reform require unanimity, 
denunciation/abolishment can be realised unilaterally. 
Maybe the fact mentioned by Michael, namely that some 
Latin American States denounced their BITs (which – in my 
understanding – may endorse investors’ rights short of 
human rights) might show that they do not take those rights 
as seriously as human rights. On the other hand, even the 
membership in human rights treaties is, at least in the public 
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debate, no longer considered to be a political no-go. 
Trinidad and Tobago had once withdrawn from FP 1 to the 
ICCPR, in order to accede again with a reservation, and that 
withdrawal from the ECHR is currently discussed in the UK 
and Switzerland. It remains to be seen whether denunciation 
action will follow, which would constitute a grave attack on 
the “sanctity” of human rights, would put into perspective 
my claim of a distinction in weight, and would furnish 
material for reflection on Michael’s idea of democratic 
reversibility of rights.
In the context of reflection on democracy, Zoran’s second 
observation is relevant, too. Zoran notes that Beyond Human 
Rights contains only quite limited sections on political rights, 
political participation, and on the barely existing law-making 
role of individuals (including their role as a global pouvoir 
constituant) in the current global system. Indeed, this whole 
dimension would warrant another book. For these matters, 
all depends, according to Zoran, on one’s “vision” of 
collective political action, seen in the context of economy 
and culture. Obviously, the enormous economic and cultural 
differences between communities or potential political 
collective actors makes global constitution-making and 
global constitutional amendment hard not only to realize but 
already difficult to conceptualize. So let’s wait for his book 
on this question.
Besides democracy, the second point made in Michael’s 
contribution is the link between “simple” international rights 
and the debate on the universality of international law. I 
share his and Sundhya Pahuja’s understanding of 
“universalism”. Obviously, international law does not 
embody apriorical and eternal truths. On the other hand, it 
is reductionist to consider the universalist claim of 
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international norms solely and always as a camouflage for 
the pursuit of national interests of the powerful players. 
“Hegemony” is no passe-partout which could explain or 
“unmask” the essence of the entire international legal order.
International law is, I would say, universal only when and as 
long as some of its principles can be based on an overlapping 
consensus by real persons across the globe, when it 
furnishes procedures to reconcile conflicting interests 
arising over global goods, territory, etc., and when it offers 
legal institutions which seek to contain damage to persons 
who live in the face of irresolvable conflicts. International 
law has, as Riegner says, a “negotiable content” – and the 
inevitable social fact is that bargaining power matters a lot in 
the negotiation of that contents. International law is not 
universal, but its formats and substance are in a constant 
and fluctuating process of aspiring at, acquiring, and loosing 
universality due to contestation and violence. What matters 
is international law’s universalizability. The downgrading of 
some rights might, it is submitted, contribute to this 
objective.
This rejoinder will be continued in our next post.
Anne Peters is Co-Director of The Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg
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